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  1. 16 de nov. de 2010 · Irrational exuberance. "Robert J. Shiller offers an unconventional interpretation of recent U.S. stock market highs and shows that Alan Greenspan's term "irrational exuberance" is a good description of the mood behind the market. He warns that poorer performance may be in the offing and tells us how we - as a society and individually - can ...

  2. Irrational Exuberance. In this revised, updated, and expanded edition of his New York Times bestseller, Nobel Prize–winning economist Robert Shiller, who warned of both the tech and housing bubbles, now cautions that signs of irrational exuberance among investors have only increased since the 2008–9 financial crisis.

  3. The book Irrational Exuberance, written by Robert J. Shiller, highlights the role of emotional and psychological factors in driving economic bubbles and market fluctuations. 2. Shiller argues that financial markets are prone to bouts of irrational exuberance, where investors become overly optimistic and drive up prices beyond fundamental values.

  4. 25 de ene. de 2015 · In other words, Irrational Exuberance is as relevant as ever. Previous editions covered the stock and housing markets—and famously predicted their crashes. This edition expands its coverage to include the bond market, so that the book now addresses all of the major investment markets.

  5. Irrational exuberance, published in 2015, is the third edition of the bestselling book by one of the most famous researchers in finance. It deals with financial history but is itself now also an important piece of the history of finance in its own right. Not only for the knowledge contained in this book but also because the first and second

  6. Find updated information related to the book "Irrational Exuberance" by Robert J. Shiller on this site.

  7. In his 2006 book Irrational Exuberance, Robert Shiller argues that high stock market valuations in 2000 and 2005 were unjustified. The text opens with Shiller examining the historic valuations (based on PE ratios) in the two periods, which were well above those seen at prior peaks in 1901, 1929 and 1966. This book, however, is not about valuation.