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  1. 4 de jul. de 2016 · Paradoxically, many dictators agree to institutionalized succession rules even though these rules could regulate their removal from office. This study shows that succession rules, like other pseudo-democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes, provide survival benefits for dictators.

    • Erica Frantz, Elizabeth A. Stein
    • 2017
  2. The chapter first examines the importance of term limits in authoritarian regimes and how they help maintain autocratic stability. The chapter then turns to examine the role of term limits and leadership turnover in three types of authoritarian rule: single-party regimes, personalist dictatorships, and military regimes.

  3. 11 de mar. de 2020 · While in personalist regimes, much depends on the leader’s resources and skills, leadership succession in one-party dictatorships tends to reflect tectonic changes within the ruling party; it is the party that controls succession and access-to-power positions (see Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010: 127).

    • Ludger Helms
    • 2020
    • Equilibrium
    • Proposition 1
    • Proposition 2

    We first show what happens with strong executive constraints. The main analysis is for the case of at weak executive constraints where we focus on two possible equilibria. In the first of these, only popular incumbents are retained and incumbents never produce good policy. In the second, an hereditary dynasty emerges where the leader’s offspring is...

    There is always an equilibrium where only popular incumbents are retained and \(e_{t}\ne s_{t}\) for all t. The logic is straightforward. Since all incumbents set \(e_{t}\ne s_{t}\), then only popularity matters to the selectorate. Hence if the leader’s offspring is popular, she will be chosen otherwise it is worthwhile picking a fresh family from ...

    Suppose that \(\Delta \ge 2\rho \left[ 1-\rho \beta \right] A\) and \(\left( 1-\rho \right) B>c,\ \)then there is an equilibrium in which the offspring of all incumbents are retained and \(e_{t}=s_{t}\)in each period. This kind of equilibrium can emerge as long as the incumbent believes that his offspring will be appointed as leader after she has p...

    • Timothy Besley, Timothy Besley, Marta Reynal-Querol
    • 2017
  4. It is true that. in most cases the problem of succession did not arise because dicta- torial rule was terminated through the premature, and more or less abrupt and violent, end of the regime as such. But even prior to such. event, little public attention is given to the problem within dictator- ships.

  5. Summary. Dictatorships have dominated global politics for hundreds of years, from the pharaohs of Egypt to the absolute monarchs of Europe. Though democracy has since spread to much of the world, about 40% of today’s countries are still ruled by dictatorship.

  6. 20 de abr. de 2016 · PDF | Paradoxically, many dictators agree to institutionalized succession rules even though these rules could regulate their removal from office. This... | Find, read and cite all the research...