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To such knowledge we never attain. The regular connection between a sign, its sense, and its referent is of such a kind that to the sign there corresponds a definite sense and to that in turn a definite referent, while to a given referent (an object) there does not belong only a single sign.
Frege’s response to this puzzle, given the distinction between sense and reference, should be apparent. Because the reference of “the evening star” and “the morning star” is the same, both statements are true in virtue of the same object’s relation of identity to itself.
1 de ago. de 2023 · In that sense, our p-knowledge is grounded in our knowledge of the True. Under the suggested epistemological reading of “On Sense and Reference”, Frege provides an entirely new picture of p-knowledge and its production. This picture bases propositional knowledge on the non-propositional knowledge of the identity of the True, which seems to ...
Introduction. Few texts are as well known to modern philosophers as Frege's (1892 c: 151–2) opening paragraph: Equality gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects?
62 TRANSLAT IONS FROM. THE W R IT ING S OF GOTTLOB FREGE. ON SENSE AND REFERENCE 63. unnecessary to bother with the reference of a part of the sentence; only the sense, not the reference, of the part is relevant to the sense of the whole sentence. The thought remains the same whether •Odysseus' has reference or not.
Two features distinguish this study from other books on Frege. First, sense and reference are placed absolutely at the core of Frege's work; the author shows that no adequate account of the theory can avoid analysing the notion of thought that underpins it, or explaining how it has clarified our concept of judgement.
19 de nov. de 2023 · On Sense and Reference. Gottlob Frege. DigiCat, Nov 19, 2023 - Philosophy - 24 pages. In the philosophy of language, the difference between sense and reference was a concept of the German philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege in 1892. This idea, presented in this work, reflects the two ways he thought a singular term might have meaning.
