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John Marshall Harlan ( 1er juin 1833 - 14 octobre 1911) est un homme de loi américain, juge à la Cour suprême 1 de 1877 à sa mort. Il s'y signale en particulier par son opinion dissidente dans l'arrêt Plessy v. Ferguson, en 1896, lorsqu'il s'oppose à la décision de la Cour qui déclare la ségrégation raciale conforme à la Constitution 2 .
Auch sein Enkel John Marshall Harlan II, der von 1955 bis 1971 ebenfalls als Verfassungsrichter wirkte, wurde als great dissenter bekannt. Im Gegensatz zu Harlan war jedoch sein Enkel ein konservativer Abweichler am liberal geprägten Gerichtshof unter dem Vorsitzenden Richter Earl Warren .
Como Harlan foi voto vencido, e as leis foram derrubadas pela Corte, a segregação continuou até 1954, quando a Corte mudou de posição, no célebre caso Brown v. Board of Education, e passou a banir a segregação racial. Seu neto homônimo John Marshall Harlan II, também foi juiz da instituição de 1955 a 1971. Referências
Profile. Nadine Strossen, the John Marshall Harlan II Professor of Law Emerita at New York Law School and past President of the American Civil Liberties Union (1991-2008), is a Senior Fellow with FIRE (the Foundation for Individual Rights and Education) and a leading expert and frequent speaker/media commentator on constitutional law and civil liberties, who has testified before Congress on ...
John Marshall Harlan II Professor of Law Director, Racial Justice Project. Contact Information T 212.431. 2351 E penelope.andrews@nyls.edu. Faculty Assistant
Grandson and namesake of Associate Justice John Marshall Harlan (1877-1911), John Marshall Harlan, II was the son of John Maynard Harlan, a lawyer and Chicago politician. He attended the Latin School of Chicago, a private day school, and two well-respected boarding schools in Canada. Upon graduation from secondary school he enrolled in ...
Harlan was a strong defender of federalism, of judicial restraint, and of the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech. His concern with federalism is manifested by his votes and opinions in criminal procedure cases. He steadfastly refused to accept the notion that the Due Process Clause incorporated all, or even some, of the Bill of Rights.
