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The most prominent argument for nihilism is the argument from queerness. J. L. Mackie argues that there are no objective ethical values , by arguing that they would be queer (strange): If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in ...
philosophy of language. ethics. philosophy of religion. Notable ideas. Argument from queerness. John Leslie Mackie FBA (25 August 1917 – 12 December 1981) was an Australian philosopher. He made significant contributions to ethics, the philosophy of religion, metaphysics, and the philosophy of language.
The argument from queerness has two forms: metaphysical and epistemological. With regards to the metaphysical version, if moral properties or entities were to exist, they would be very unusual ("queer") things. Epistemologically, it is unclear how we could come to know about such entities.
- John Leslie Mackie
- 1977
The Argument from Queerness has two strands: one metaphysical and one epistemological. The first states that our conception of a moral property is essentially one of a very unusual kind of property, such that countenancing its instantiation requires us to posit in the world “qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different ...
The first step of the argument from queerness is to identify ways in which moral properties and facts are queer; the second step is to offer debunking explanations of moral belief. Four queerness arguments are identified, concerning supervenience, knowledge, motivation, and irreducible normativity.
24 de oct. de 2019 · Mackie’s moral error theory is encapsulated in the opening sentence of his 1977 book Ethics: inventing right and wrong: ‘There are no objective values’ ( 1977, p. 15). He gives two main arguments for this claim, which he calls the ‘argument from relativity’ and the ‘argument from queerness’ (pp. 36–42).
18 de mar. de 2021 · This paper argues that even if we assume that ethical facts are metaphysically queer and explanatorily redundant, the argument from queerness does not warrant the rejection of ethical facts. It only shows that it is most reasonable to refrain from believing that ethical facts exist.
